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Abstract
The market structure-performance relationship has been tested for US banking in industrial organization studies.
Two divergent hypotheses with regard to this relationship are the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP)
Paradigm and Efficient Structure Hypothesis (ESH). This paper presents the test results of both hypotheses with
respect to the New York State S&L associations using the time-series and cross sectional (firm-level) data for the
most recent period 2000-2010. The results of PEGLS regression indicate that performances of S&Ls vary with
respect to operating cost, credit risk and capitalization. Neither market share nor concentration, however, plays a
significant role in explaining profitability. The results partially support the ESH as an explanation for the market
behavior of New York State S&L associatons. Given that profitable banks are efficient but also risk dependent,
additional policies are warranted in order to mitigate risk and maintain the safety and soundness for the
remaining S&Ls in the New York State.
Keywords: S&L industry, subprime mortgage crisis, Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP), Relative Market
Power (RMP), Concentration, HHI, Efficient Structure Hypothesis (EFS), X-Efficiency, scale efficiency
JEL: G21; B15; C50; E50; P16
1. Introduction
In recent years marked by financial instability, banking sector performance has become an increasingly
noteworthy research topic. While this research has been largely limited to US and European banking, a growing
body of research examined determinants of performance in non-bank institutions, particularly in the US Savings
and Loan associations. For decades, S&Ls operated as specialized banks offering mortgage loans and savings
accounts at low-interest and insured accounts. Studies highlighting firm-specific factors emphasized ownership
and control, managerial efficiency and profitable ownership structure. Studies published during the mid-1980s
and later extensively focused on regulation, deregulation and insolvency risks and the impact of change in
ownership (stock versus mutual) on efficiency and cost structure (Balderston 1985; Benston, 1986; Kane, 1989;
Barth, 1991; Curry and Shibut, 2000; Mester, 1993; Cebenoyan, Cooperman and Register, 1995; Fraser and
Zardkoohi, 1996).
Since the unfolding of the US financial crisis in 2007, bank performance has received renewed attention in the
ongoing effort to mitigate risks and revitalize the financial industry. Mergers and acquisitions have a bearing on
S&L performance against a backdrop of frequent failures. The aim of this article is therefore two-fold: First, it
aims to extend the literature by focusing on the S&L sector in the New York state. Since New York has been the
epicenter of economic crisis, it is noteworthy to look at the current trends in the financial sector in that state. The
second aim of this paper is to gain an insight into a significant determinant of financial performance mostly
associated with market structures, namely concentration and competition. In this regard, two competing
hypotheses--Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) Paradigm and Efficient Structure Hypothesis (ESH)--are
tested against the background of previous literature. US anti-trust policy that evaluates bank mergers is based on
the assumption of positive relationship between market structure (overall concentration level) and collusive
profits. On the other hand, ESH suggests that market share of individual firms explains the positive relationship
between market structure and firm profits (Evanoff and Fortier, 1988:277). It is hoped that testing the
assumptions of these theories can provide new insights for anti-trust policy and financial regulation at the state
level.
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In determining performance, we use the most popular proxy measured by Return on Assets (ROA) and regress it
with bank-specific and industry-specific indicators. We have not included macroeconomic variables given that
all institutions operate in the same macroeconomic environment and there is no a priori reason to assume that
profitability levels vary with growth rate of GDP. Our findings indicate that profits are negatively related to
operating costs (operational costs/total assets), credit risk and liquidity risk. Risk is one of the most important
components of profitability as indicated by the negative coefficient sign of credit risk. This reveals that banks
with substantial amount of loan loss provisions-to-total assets make riskier loans than banks with less risky loans.
A key finding is that neither market share nor the standard concentration ratio (HHI), commonly used in bank
performance research, has a significant impact on bank profits. While our evidence partially supports the ESH as
an explanation of firm-specific efficiency, it does not support either of the theories as an explanation for the
market behavior of New York State S&Ls. An additional robustness check shows that findings are robust and
consistent after controlling industry-related variables and inter-correlation in the sample banks.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the main
developments in the Savings and Loan Industry as background to the empirical work. In Section 3, we present an
overview of the relevant literature on market structures/performance relationship and discuss the strengths and
shortcomings of previous studies. Section 4 and Section 5 present the empirical model along with a description
of the data and variables used in the study. Section 6 yields the results of the empirical analysis. Section 7
discusses the policy implications of empirical findings. Section 8 presents the conclusion and draws strategic
lessons from this study for future researchers.
2. Historical Background: Consolidation of New York Savings and Loan Industry
In the early 1990s, the New York S&L industry (also known as thrifts) went through a major process of
expansion and consolidation. Firms are generally fewer and larger today but operate in increasingly concentrated
markets. S&Ls took larger risks as a result of the deregulation in the early 1980s. During this period, a large
number of institutions failed due to undercapitalization, managerial inefficiency and engagement in large-scale
speculation, especially in real estate and commercial loans. Various explanations put forward for the crisis
include lack of adequate supervision, reduced capital ratios, adverse economic conditions and deregulation of
asset structure and interest rates (Balderston 1985; Benston, 1986; Kane, 1989; Barth, 1991; Mishkin, 1999;
Curry and Shibut, 2000). In addition, stock-owned institutions displayed more risky portfolios than did mutual
institutions (Mester, 1993; Cebenoya et al, 1995;Fraser and Zardkoohi, 1996).
Jayaratne and Hall (1996) argue that consolidation among both types of depository institutions (commercial
banks and thrifts) increased from 1989 to 1994 in the Federal Reserve Second District’s five largest banking
markets: Albany, Buffalo, Metro New York-New Jersey, Rochester and Syracuse. Overall, an increase in
consolidation came from three fronts: Thrift failures contributed to increased market concentration more than
mergers did, especially in Buffalo, Rochester and Syracuse. Prominent New York City institutions, such as Bank
of New York, Dime Savings and Chemical Bank, withdrew entirely from the upstate markets. Additionally, the
market share of midsized banks increased at the expense of larger institutions. Using local market deposit
concentration (HHI Index) as a proxy for competition in retail banking, they show that HHI increased at a faster
rate than the national average in four markets, with Albany experiencing 61 percent increase in concentration.
Buffalo experienced the largest decline in the number of institutions while Metro New York-New Jersey
experienced the smallest reduction but increased merger activity. Despite the process of consolidation, however,
the banking markets remained un-concentrated, with HHI of less than 1000 and competition still vibrant. Overall
improved efficiency, elimination of weaker banks, better diversified services and the growth of market share in
midsized banks undercut assumptions that the New York market is excessively concentrated.
Failures, mergers and acquisitions reflected a trend towards consolidation at the national level as well. Among
New York’s 493 depository institutions in 1989, 55 (11.2 percent) were “eliminated” by mergers and 52 (10.5
percent) by thrift failures (Jayaratne and Hall, 1996:2). From January 1, 1986 to year-end 1995, “the number of
federally insured thrift institutions in the United States declined from 3,234 to 1,645 or by approximately 50
percent” (Curry and Shibut, 2000:26). As some weaker institutions were eliminated, many prominent and large
S&Ls like Washington Mutual and World Savings became subsidiaries of bank holding companies (Ely, 2008).
Market consolidation continued unabated with the financial crisis in 2008, when failures such as IndyMac led to
the third largest bank collapse in US history, costing “more than 10% of the FDIC’s $53 billion deposit
insurance fund” after Continental Illinois in 1986 and First Republic Bank in 1988 (Palette and Enrich, 2008).
IndyMac speculated in Alt-A loans, one level up from subprime loans (Hudson, 2008). Washington Mutual, the
largest American savings and loan association, also collapsed in 2008, ending in the largest bank failure in US
history to date and facilitating its acquisition by J.P Morgan Chase for $1.9 billion.
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During the 2007-2010 crisis, New York banking experienced some consolidation but the statistics do not
confirm decreased competition in local markets. According to Wheelock (2011), the crisis eliminated 318
commercial banks and savings institutions, nearly 4 percent of total number of banks at the end of 2006. For
example, the acquisition of Washington Mutual had little effect on competitive conditions in financial centers.
Especially Houston and New York City stayed relatively un-concentrated after the acquisition. Except for a few
rural banking markets, market concentration did not increase after acquisitions of failed banks by competitors.
Banks that acquired some of the failed banks were already serving the same market.
When we examine all New York State S&L institutions in 2011, the consolidation over the 2000-2011 was in
fact modest (Figure 2). Although the total number of institutions decreased in Metro-New York and upstate
markets from 47 to 40 (Figure 1), market concentration has decreased 55 percent as measured by the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). Used by the Department of Justice in order to analyze the competitive
effects of bank mergers, HHI is determined by calculating sum of squared market shares of all banks in the New
York State area. The highest level of concentration was 0.34 (3400) and the lowest 0.15 (1500), indicating “high
concentration” in 2000 but “un-concentrated” markets in 2011. Paralleling reduced number of institutions, there
has been a consolidation in total industry assets, as reflected in 29 percent decrease from $65 billion in 1995 to
$46 billion in 2011. As shown in Figure 3, 5 S&Ls account for 70.77 percent of total industry assets ($46 billion)
in 2011.With the exception of Albany, the largest institutions are concentrated in the New York Metro area:
Astoria, Flushing, Trustco, Dime-Savings and Provident Bank.
Albeit their smaller share of the market but large concentration in nonprime loans (Alt-A and subprime),
federally insured S&Ls suffered the greatest losses when the housing market collapsed in 2008. American Home
Mortgage, which operated as a real estate investment trust, collapsed and filed for bankruptcy on August 6, 2007.
In January 2008, Bank of America acquired Countrywide Financial, the largest U.S. mortgage lender, for $4
billion after its stock prices had dropped 80% in value since 2007 (Morgenson, 2007; Mildenberg, 2008). In
April 2007, New Century Financial Corporation, another real estate investment trust and second biggest U.S.
mortgage lender, filed for bankruptcy after effectively reducing its labor force by 54% (CNN, 2007).
There are fears that a reduced number of institutions would dampen market competition. There are also concerns
that the remaining organizations are getting larger and the financial industry is becoming “too big to fail” again.
Market concentration weakens competition (and consumer welfare) by fostering “collusive” behavior among
banks and more than normal profits. Experts are divided over whether such collusion exists, and where they
agree that it does, differ over the policyinterventions necessary to prevent it. The following review of literature
highlights the debate around the underlying causes of bank performance and its relationship to market structures.
3. A Brief Overview of Research on Market Concentration, Competition and Financial Performance
There is a vast body of literature on the determinants of financial sector performance in different parts of the
world (Short, 1979; Bourke, 1989; Berger et al, 1993; Berger, 1995a; 1995b; Goldberg and Rai, 1996;
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2000; Molyneux et al, 2004). Research on S&L performance has primarily drawn
from broader research across the entire banking industry (Brigham, 1964; Benston, 1972; Verbrugge et al., 1976;
Geehan and Allen, 1978; Mester, 1993; Bradley, Gabriel and Wohar, 1995; Cebenoyan et al., 1995; Kaushik and
Lopez, 1996; Jahere, Page and Hudson, 2006). The argument that market structures influence firm behavior is
prevalent among 3 schools of thought: The Structure Conduct Performance (SCP) Paradigm, Efficient Structure
Hypothesis (ESH) and Relative Market Power Hypothesis (RMPH). Market structures refer to market
competition of firms (or lack thereof) and sectoral variables (concentration ratios; market growth) that are
external to firm-level variables such as bank size, capital ratios, operating expenses, liquidity ratios, financial
leverage and ownership structure (Rasiah, 2010:1-2; Athasanoglu et al., 2006:8).
As Molyneux et al (2004) note, the SCP paradigm flows from the oligopolistic theory of banking and the
“collusive” behavior of firms. It is based on the proposition that the level of competition weakens in
concentrated markets, fostering “collusion” among fewer firms and resulting in super-profits for the banking
industry. This hypothesis suggests that market competition has a direct influence on profitability as measured by
return on assets, return on equity and net interest margin. Banks operating in monopolistic markets charge higher
interest on loans, lower rates on deposits, and higher fees than banks in competitive markets. The degree of
concentration negatively impacts competition but is positively associated with profits regardless of firm specific
efficiencies—the larger the market concentration, the less the degree of competition and higher the profits
(Gilbert, 1984:618; Loyd-Williams et al, 1994:437).
The majority of early studies of the financial industry support the traditional SCP hypothesis (Short, 1979). In a
representative study of North American, European and Australian banking markets, for example, Bourke (1989)
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found support for the traditional hypothesis of the positive relationship between collusive profits and
concentration. Based on Bourke’s approach in a pooled sample of European banks in 1986- 1989, Molyenux and
Thornton (1992) showed that profits (pre-tax return on assets) are positively correlated with ten bank
concentration ratio, payroll expenditures, nominal interest rates and government ownership. Their findings also
lend support to the Edwards-Heggestad-Mingo hypothesis from the early SCP studies. In other words, banks
with market power are more likely to display “expense preference” behavior. This type of behavior indicates that
overhead expenses are beyond the profit maximizing level of competitive banks. Vennet’s (1993) findings
further indicate that in some European countries, Belgium, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, collusive profits prevail.
Related shortcomings of the SCP paradigm are summarized at greater length in Berger (1995b), Golberg and Rai
(1996) and several others. In an important criticism of the SCP methodology, Gilbert (1984), Ruthenberg (1994)
Goldberg and Rai (1996) note that bank regulation such as entry/exit barriers and direct efficiency measures tend
to be neglected. For example, SCP should hold true in markets with greater entry barriers where market
participants are effectively protected from competition. Widespread criticisms of neglected variables spurred two
alternative explanations: The Relative Market Power Hypothesis (RMPH) and Efficient Structure Hypothesis
(ESH). RMPH, which is a special variant of SCP, introduces “market share” as a proxy for the efficiency of
firms. Profits increase in banks with larger market shares because of their ability to generate efficiency, which
normally leads to higher market power. In this hypothesis, market share is positively related to firm-specific
efficiencies (for example, through superior management and product differentiation), which also explains the
positive relationship between concentration and profits. RMPH is supported when market share is positively
related to profitability after controlling for the effects of concentration and efficiency. Additionally, higher
profits do not always need to occur in concentrated markets (Goldberg and Rai, 1996:749). Smirlock (1985)
introduces the market share as a proxy for firm-specific efficiency with a positive coefficient but finds that there
is no relationship between concentration and profitability.
Goldberg and Rai (1996) draw a contrast to the two market-power theories (SCP and RMPH) through their
Efficient-Structure-Hypothesis (ESH) that incorporates direct efficiency measures. They applied stochastic cost
frontier approach, first proposed by Aigner et al (1977) and tested by Cebenoyan et al (1993) and Mester (1993)
for the savings and loan industry. This approach derives measures of X-inefficiency and scale inefficiency and
incorporates them directly into the tests under the Berger and Hannan (1993) model. Under the X-Efficiency
(ESX) hypothesis, more efficient firms generate higher profits because they can produce a given combination
output at minimum cost through superior management or technology. This gives efficient banks a “comparative
advantage” to obtain additional profits regardless of the extent of market concentration and/or entry barriers. It is
very likely that resulting market share leads to higher market concentration. Therefore, in this hypothesis, the
direction of causality runs from efficiency to profits and market structures, not the other way around. When net
interest margin is used as the measure of performance, however, efficiency measures are negatively correlated
with performance because more efficient banks provide customers with more competitive loan and deposit rates
(Goldberg and Rai, 1996:745-749). Under these assumptions, Goldberg and Rai find little support for the SCP
hypothesis but they present evidence for one of the two versions of the ESH in 11 European countries in
1988-1991
In Berger’s study (1995b) of 30 cross sections of 1980s banking data, the evidence lends partial support to
X-efficiency version of ESH. A necessary condition for the ESH is that efficiency affects market structure, in
other words efficient firms will capture higher profits and market share and will also be responsible for higher
concentration. While X-efficiency is positively associated with profits in Berger, it is not sufficiently correlated
with market share or concentration in order to support the profit-market structure relationship. On the other hand,
Papadopoulou’s analysis (2004) of European banking performance does not provide support for any of the
assumptions of ESH, finding instead that efficiency and bank size are related (ie., “big banks are more
X-efficient than small banks”). Similarly, Casu and Girardone (2006), who examined the competitive conditions
of European banking for the period 1997-2003, note that the level of concentration is not related to the level of
competition.
Recent evidence indicates that none of the hypotheses are fully adequate to explain bank profits, suggesting that
alternative variables be tested. In the analysis of S&L performance, selecting variables for resolving the
differences between SCP and two versions of ESH presents challenges. Today thrifts are operating in an
environment very different from the 1980s and 1990s. Profits vary not only by market types (bank-based versus
market-based financial systems), but also between different sizes of banks, different services and ownership
types, which may affect competitive conditions differently. For example, small banks are often regarded as
“community banks” with different competitive advantages than large banks, such as serving more opaque and
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smaller borrowers and offering retail-oriented rather than wholesale businesses. Standard indices like HHI and
CRn often treat the competitive advantages of different institutions equally, presenting “endogeneity problems”
in bank performance analysis. This has invited the use of alternative measures of competition that include sunk
costs and non-structural models like Panzar-Rosse statistic. As such, when examining the impact of market
structures on profitability, researchers often incorporate regulation, the role of government, entry and exit
barriers and other legal conditions for competition, such as shareholder rights, transparency, and trade openness
among countries and within financial markets (Berger et al, 2004:436-437).
Furthermore, organizational forms can have a crucial effect on bank performance. Such forms include corporate
governance structure, ownership and control and conflicts of interests between owners and managers. In a study
of S&L ownership structure, Akella and Greenbaum (1988) reveal that managers of mutual S&Ls display greater
expense preference behavior than managers of stock-holder S&Ls. Their results are consistent with earlier SCP
studies, indicating that mutual S&Ls invest a high proportion of assets in loans and “source” a higher proportion
of liabilities from deposits. Knopf and Teall (1996) examine the impact of ownership and regulation-the
Financial Institutions and Reform and Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA)-on risk-taking
behavior in the US thrift industry. This was a period of re-regulation aiming to increase capital ratios, regulate
the use of brokered CDs and minimize real estate equity holdings. Their findings are consistent with classical
agency theory that insider shareholders tend to pursue strategies that meet their own interests (utility) rather than
the value of the firm. Increased risk activity in S&Ls is associated with high levels of insider (management)
shareholdings. This relationship is explained by the role of “entrenched managers”. Such managers display more
risk-taking behavior than institutional shareholders with more diversified portfolios. Furthermore, the ability of
insiders to extract private benefits from outside interests (such as real estate development firms; lobby groups)
may decrease return on assets and may negatively affect firm performance.
Based on the notion of managerial control, ownership and deregulation, other researchers evaluated the
efficiency and profitability of S&L institutions. The common finding has been that stock organizations are likely
to be more effective than other types of organizations. Especially in the expense-preference theory, mutual thrifts
are considered to be less efficient because they do not have greater access to capital and lack profit maximizing
pressures from owners. Therefore, as Mester (1991) notes, mutual S&Ls operate with “an inefficient output mix”
which leads to conflicts of interest between owners and managers. For example, managers of mutual firms might
be willing to sacrifice profit by making safer investments so as to reduce risk or maximize interests through
“expense preference behavior”.
While different ownership types influence performance differently, there is no clear consensus in the empirical
literature as to whether mutual firms are less profitable than stockholder firms. In an important extension of
Akella and Greenbaum’s work (1988) using a much larger sample, Gropper and Hudson (2003) report evidence
in favor of better managerial efficiency and decreasing expense-preference in S&Ls that survived the financial
crisis. This is due to the removal of barriers on competition rather than ownership type. In a stochastic cost
frontier approach to a sample of 559 firms in Atlanta district, however, Cebenoyan et al (1993) report that there
is no difference between the efficiency of joint stock and mutual thrifts.
The review in the preceding section discussed some of the factors influencing financial institution performance.
The 3 hypotheses (SCP, RMPH, ESH) pertaining to this topic provide the useful framework for the performance
analysis in this study. Additional problems, however, common to these theories concern the appropriate measure
of market structure and performance. For example, SCP “offers no information on the absolute number or size
distribution of firms necessary to exercise market power” (Evanofff and Fortier, 1988:280). While New York
markets display regional characteristics that are hard to quantify, the SCP hypothesis should hold true in states
with greater entry barriers. However, the ESH proposes that banks with efficient production should always reap
higher profits regardless of the degree of concentration and entry barriers. This paper looks at how market
structures and firm-level characteristics contribute to the performance of New York S&Ls over the period
2000-2010. Our methodology incorporates some of the developments in econometrics, namely panel unit root
and panel regression tests that may illuminate recent trends in the New York thrift markets.
4. Data, Variables and Hypotheses
This study employs multi-dimensional panel data over the period 2000-2011. Our data include time-series and
cross-sectional information for all insured and regulated S&L associations (40 as of 2011) in the New York State.
The firm-level data, including the number of banking firms and all proxies, come from the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) database: FDIC Institution Directory http://www2.fdic.gov/IDASP/main.asp.
While there are missing values for some variables in our sample, each S&L is observed every year. Thus we have
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used in our empirical work balanced panel data that amount to total observations of 420.
Following the ratios used in previous studies, we identify the determinants of S&L associationperformance as
follows. The performance measure chosen is bank “profit” measured as return on assets (ROA). ROA is
“annualized net income including gains or losses on securities and extraordinary items” divided by average total
assets (FDIC, 2002). We have decided not to use return on equity (ROE) = Net Income/Total Equity as the
dependent variable because some banks contain negative equity. While ROA and ROE have been used in most
studies, other studies have also used net interest margin (NIM) as a proxy for the “pricing ability of banks” for
deposits and loans. If the SCP hypothesis holds true, then the net interest margin will be higher. NIM indicates
the ability of monopolistic banks to charge lower deposit rates and higher loan rates (Goldberg and Rai,
1996:752). However, individual prices may not always be a reliable profit measure because banking is a
multi-product industry and pricing strategies differ across banks and across markets. Banks are likely to
cross-subsidize in the presence of regulations (Evanoff and Fortier, 1988: 281). Use of the profit measure as
ROA should filter some of these potential problems.
The independent variables include both market-specific (microeconomic/industry-related) and firm-level
variables and are similar to those utilized in previous studies. In analyzing market structure, we consider New
York State to be a market. The SCP and efficient structure hypotheses are tested by the addition of market
structure variables--concentration ratios-and firm-specific market shares (MS) defined as ratio of each bank’s
deposits-to-total industry deposits. We have employed the two popular measures of concentration--the four-bank
concentration ratio (CR4) and the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI). While MS captures firm-efficiency
(Relative Market Power Hypothesis), CR4 and HHI are market structure indicators. CR4 is defined as the ratio
of total deposits of the four largest S&Ls to the total deposits of all S&Ls in the New York state. Similarly, HHI
is defined as the sum of squared market shares of deposits of all the S&Ls. But since CR4 does not use market
shares of all banks in the industry, we prefer to use HHI as an indicator of market structure. HHI provides a more
comprehensive picture by giving weight to each bank’s market share. Logarithm of total assets (the proxy for
size-induced scale economies), while being insignificant in all regressions, is excluded for causing
inter-correlation with MS.
Several control variables are introduced to account for firm-level risk and managerial efficiency. Since
performance measure ROA is not risk adjusted, we employ three variables to account for differing leverage,
credit and liquidity risks among firms. EQV, equity capital-to-asset ratio, indicates the level of leverage used by a
company (bank risk) and relative portion of the equity used to finance a company’s assets. We expect the
relationship between leverage and profit to be both negative and positive. Higher equity ratio indicates more
capital and less leverage, which could result in decreased borrowing costs. Firms with lower borrowing costs can
become more profitable. Conversely, lower equity ratio or “higher leverage indicates aggressive asset/liability
management which leads to higher interest margins (NIM) and profits” (Golberg and Rai, 1996:757). LIQ,
average loan-to-average asset ratio, measures the riskiness of loans since loans are riskier and generate higher
returns (ROE or ROA) than other assets such as government securities (Evanoff and Fortier, 1988:282).
Therefore, a positive relationship ties liquidity and profitability. On the other hand, higher loan-to-asset ratio can
also decrease profitability by increasing bank risks.
Following Athasanoglu et al (2006) and Pervan et al (2009), we use CRIS1, loan loss provision-to-loan ratio, as
a proxy for credit/default risk and asset quality. Each year, banks set aside“loan loss provision” as an allowance
for bad loans (customer defaults, unpaid loans, non-performing loans, etc.). The amount of provisions set aside
increases with the riskiness of the loans. A bank having a larger loan loss provision makes a large amount of
risky or poor loans compared to a bank setting aside smaller amount. Credit risk affects the performance of an
institution since increased risk is normally associated with decreased profitability. Poor asset quality is one of the
main causes of bank failures (Miller and Noulas, 1997). On the other hand, higher ratio of allowance for bad
loans can affect profitability positively; banks with a large number of risky loans can charge higher interest rate
for the likelihood of higher customer default. Therefore, while the coefficient of CRIS1 is expected to be
negative, it can also be positive.
EEFR is the operating efficiency ratio available in the FDIC database as a bank-specific variable. We have used
this ratio as a proxy for managerial and operating efficiency. EEFR is defined as “noninterest expense minus
foreclosed property expense minus amortization of intangibles, expressed as a percentage of the sum of net
interest income plus noninterest income” and reflects the “proportion of net operating revenues absorbed by
overhead expenses” (FDIC, 2002). Since EEFR is an operating cost ratio, we expect the coefficient sign to be
negative under the Efficient Structure Hypothesis (ESH). Lower ratio indicates lower overhead costs and greater
operating efficiency of the institution, which could then result in higher profits.
13
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While NIMY, the net interest margin, was used in previous studies as a proxy for performance (Angbazo, 1997;
Demirguc-Kunt and Huiziga, 1999; 2000; Goldberg and Rai, 1996), this study uses it as a right-hand side
variable. NIMY is the difference between interest income and interest expense as a percentage of interest bearing
assets (FDIC, 2002). Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) point out that profits and netinterest margins are
higher in countries with lower levels of economic growth whereas the impact of growth on profits is exhausted
in developed financial systems (countries with higher levels of GDP per capita). Banking research indicates that
banks in highly concentrated markets charge higher rates on loans, and pay lower rates on deposits than banks in
more competitive markets. Therefore, net interest margins and profits decrease as competition increases. In
addition, Smirlock (1985) stresses that interest rate spreads are narrower in concentrated banking industry
whereas Angbazo (1997) finds that higher net interest margins are associated with more risky loans and higher
interest-rate risk exposure. Different types of risks are associated with “concentration in short-term assets and
off-balance sheet hedging (OBS) instruments”.
5. Econometric Methodology
Following Evanoff and Fortier (1988) and Lloyd-Williams et al (1994:438), we present the following equations
to test the competing hypotheses for the New York State S&L associations. The reduced form of profit equation
is displayed below:

PROFITit   0  1I t   2 MSit   Xit
i

where PROFITit is a performance measure (ROA) for the firm i during the period t; X is a vector of control
variables, which are intended to account for firm- specific variables for bank i at time t; I t is a measure of



market structure, usually a concentration measure HHI 



S
si


 --sum of squared market shares (S) of all banks
t 
2

at time t and accounts for industry/market-specific characteristics. MSit is market share for firm i during the
period t and used for controlling firm-specific efficiencies.

 t captures the random error or disturbance in time

denoted by white noise (residual),  i the unobserved individual (bank-specific or “entity fixed effect”) and
uit the remainder of the disturbance or error term. An unobserved variable varies from one bank to the other but
is constant over time. We want to estimate YROA (PROFIT), the effect on Y of X holding constant unobserved
bank characteristics. In the fixed-effect model, this can be interpreted as having n intercepts one for each entity
with the constant slope for all entities (Stock and Watson, 2011:354).
In the augmented regression equation below, the traditional SCP hypothesis holds true if 1  0 and  2  0 ;
and the efficiency hypothesis (ESH) if 1  0 and  2  0 (Lloyd-Williams et al, 1994:438).

ln PROFITit   0  1 ln HHI t   2 ln MSit   3 ln EQVit   4 ln LIQit   5 ln EEFFRit 
 6 lnCRIS1it   7 ln NIMYit  it

it   i  uit
where all the variables are expressed in natural logarithms:
Log of PROFIT= bank i’s profit measured as the return on assets (ROA)
Log of HHI= concentration ratio in the New York State savings and loan industry (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index)
Log of MS= market share measure, total deposits of each bank-to-total deposits of industry ratio
Log of EQV=Equity capital-to-asset ratio (bank risk/leverage/capitalization)
Log of LIQ= Average loan-to-average asset ratio (liquidity risk)
Log of EEFFR=Noninterest expense-to-sum of net interest income and noninterest income ratio
Log of CRIS1=Loan loss allowance-to-loans ratio (credit risk)
Log of NIMY=Interest income minus interest expense-to-earning assets ratio (net interest margin)
With respect to the testing procedure, we apply both the Panel Least Squares method of fixed effects (FE) and
Panel Estimated Generalized Least Square (PEGLS) method of random effects (RE). Fundamentally, both panels
are applications of the OLS estimator to the augmented equation displayed above. While both of the models
allows for cross-sectional and time-series effects (Baltagi, 2001), there is a need to control heterogeneity in units
14
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of observation. In the fixed effects (FE) model, unobserved individual heterogeneity (firm-level characteristics)
varies from bank to bank (different intercepts) but do not vary across time (constant slope). In the random effects
model (PEGLS), however, there are no fixed or individual effects and heterogeneity in units of observation is
uncorrelated with the independent variables (Yaffe, 2006). PEGLS has the advantage of generalizing beyond the
sample in the analysis. Following a procedure advanced in previous studies, we use the Hausman (1978)
specification test to determine which effect to use.
Before applying the Hausman test, however, we pretest if all variables are integrated of order one in levels.
Variables with unit root exhibit trending or non-stationary behavior leading to spurious relationships between the
explanatory and outcome variables (Cromwell, Labys & Terraza, 1994:23). Therefore, it is important to check
whether the variables included in our models contain a unit root. Several panel unit root tests are used for
verifying the non-stationary of the variables--for instance, Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC) (2002), Breitung (2000),
Im Pesaran and Shin (IPS) (2003), and Fisher-type tests using ADF and PP tests. While LLC and Breitung tests
assume a common unit root process,    1, where the lag orders for the difference terms ( i ) are identical
across sections, IPS, Fisher-ADF and Fisher-PP allallow for individual unit root processes so that i varies
across sections. In LLC and Breitung, a null hypothesis of unit root for the common process, H 0 :   0, is
tested against the alternative hypothesis of no unit root, H :   0. A unit root test renders the data stationary
by applying first or second difference operator to the OLS estimator. We have selected the optimal length
automatically using the Schwarz criterion. Individual intercepts and trend terms, which include both fixed effects
and trends, are included in the test equation.
6. Results and Discussion
This section discusses the results of the empirical analysis. First, it reviews the descriptive statistics of test data.
Next it evaluates the inferential statistics in order to reject or accept the competing hypotheses (SCP, RMPH,
ESH) discussed in the previous section.
As descriptive statistics indicate, the continuing US economic downturn highlights some of the trends in ROA.
Based on the average of cross-sections, the highest profitability is in 2002 and lowest in 2009. The maximum
value corresponds to the beginning of real estate bubble and lowest value to the height of subprime mortgage
crisis. The cyclical component of time-series indicates that profitability reached the highest levels during the
housing boom (2000-2004) and then started to decrease after 2005. During 2000-2010, market concentration of
firms averaged around 0.2344 as measured by HHI Index. An HHI index between 0.15 and 0.25 (or 1,500 to
2,500) indicates moderate concentration or oligopolistic competition. While the average concentration of 0.23
may support the hypothesis of collusive profits in the New York State, there is a general trend of decreasing
concentration, as indicated by highest value in 2000 (0.34) and lowest (0.15) in 2011.
Low standard deviations indicate that the data points are not highly variable or dispersed. Whereas high
deviation implies that the data points are spread out over a large range of values, low deviation indicates that
data points tend to be close to the mean; there are no outliers in the data set. The standard deviation of HHI
shows some statistical dispersion in data used for measuring concentration. This highlights the variation in
sample size supporting the trend line in Figure 2. Table 2 summarizes the Pearson correlation coefficient of test
data among independent variables. The estimated correlation coefficients show that there is no high-level
correlation among variables included in the regression analysis. In other words, independent variables are not
correlated to a degree to create multi-collinearity problem.
Time series panel unit root tests are reported in Table 3. Based on an automatic selection of optimal lag value,
our tests confirm that all natural logarithm of variables except net interest margin (NIMY) contain unit roots. All
variables seem to be stationary in first differences, while non-stationary in levels. Only LIQ is stationary in
second difference. ROA fails the Breitung test in common root, but passes other tests in first difference. Based
on the results of five panel unit root tests, all the variables in the model are integrated of order one and thus
rendered stationary.
Table 4 reports the results of Hausman misspecification test. This test determines whether our model is
appropriate for panel data analysis and it is free of misspecification. The null hypothesis of no misspecification is
tested against the alternative of misspecification. The results indicate no evidence to reject the null hypothesis of
no correlation between unobserved random error and independent variables. In other words, with the test
probability (p value 0.0866) greater than the critical value of 0.05, it is appropriate to use the random effect model
instead of the fixed effect model.
Returning to inferential statistics, all ROA based regressions provide evidence of the impact of firm-specific
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variables on bank performance. Results of the random effect panel regression are reported in Table 5, which are
based on 420 observations. When all variables are included for the final estimation, the regression model is
significant at p value based on Probability (F Statistic). Probability (F Statistic) measures whether the
relationship between the control variables and dependent variable is significant. Overall regression function has
an explanatory power of 24 percent presented by R-squared; right hand side variables explain the dependent
variable by 24 percent and the F statistic supports the regression. Overall, our regression model is significant at a
level lower than 5 percent, so we can be reasonably confident that the good fit of the equation is not due to
chance.
The traditional SCP hypothesis holds true if 1  0 and  2  0 ; and the efficiency hypothesis (ESH) if 1  0
and  2  0 (Lloyd-Williams et al, 1994:438). Both of these conditions must be satisfied in order to accept
market structure theories unconditionally. Although the coefficient of HHI (absolute value) is different than 0,
market share does not equal zero. Therefore, SCP is rejected. When controlling the effect of HHI, on the other
hand, MS is still insignificant and fails to reject the RMPH that market share of firms determine profitability
regardless of the degree of market concentration. ESH would be supported if efficiency, through the market
share variable, were significantly correlated with profitability. Overall, none of the market power hypotheses
(SCP, RMPH, ESH) support the importance of market structures as an explanation of firm performance in the
New York S&L industry. Neither market share of individual firms nor market concentration has meaningful
associations with profitability.
The profitability of New York S&L associations is dependent on several firm-level characteristics rather than
market structures. When we add up market shares and microeconomic variables to the first model, effects of
bank level variables do not change that much. More efficient banks are more profitable as indicated in Table 5.
As the ratio of operational costs to total assets (EEFFR) increases by one point, the profitability of banks
decrease by 0.001 points. Although market share is not significantly related to profitability in order to support
ESH unconditionally, the significance of firm-level efficiency gives partial support to ESH. At the micro-level,
efficiency is captured from cost saving advantages related to firm-specific/managerial efficiencies rather than
market shares. While we expect efficient firms to capture higher market share, results do not necessarily support
this conclusion.
Most importantly, our results show that risk is an important component of bank profits. While successful banks
are more profitable, they are not less risk free. The role of risk is expressed through the incorporation of liquidity
risk and credit risk variables. As banks become more risky (LIQ), their profits decrease in all regressions, as
evident in decrease in return on assets (ROA) by 0.02 points. Riskier loans generate more lucrative returns than
other assets such as government securities. Therefore, one would expect a positive relationship between LIQ and
ROA. However, too much liquidity can also decrease profitability by exposing banks to credit risks, interest rate
risks, defaults risks, etc. Likewise, credit risk (CRIS1), defined as ratio of loss allowance-to-total loans, can be
the primary risk in the banking system. The loan loss provision set aside each year increases with the riskiness of
the loans. A bank having a low loan loss provision makes a small amount of risky loans compared to a bank
committed to a higher provision. As indicated in Table 5, credit ratio and profitability are inversely related,
suggesting that S&Ls might be making risky loans. Management of credit risk is essential to bank performance;
in fact, capital depletion through loan losses has been the proximate cause of most bank failures in the recent
crisis.
Unexpectedly, net interest margin has no impact on profitability in any of the regressions. Previous research
indicates that net interest margins are high in concentrated markets where collusive profits exist. Interest margins
decrease with more fragmentation and development of competitive conditions in banking markets. Although the
coefficient of NIMY becomes more significant after introducing HHI, it is still insignificant statistically.
Finally, capitalization (EQV) is inversely related to profitability. According to the literature, the coefficient of
EQV can be both positive and negative. Higher ratio of equity-to-total assets indicates more capital and less
leverage, which could result in decreased borrowing costs and thus higher profits. Conversely, lower ratio
indicates more leverage and more aggressive asset liability management, which may lead to higher return on
assets. Unlike debt capital, which is raised by incurring debt through the issuance of bonds, equity capital is
invested money raised from owners of the company. The coefficient of EQV is compatible with the second
explanation emphasizing inverse relationship. 1 unit increase in capitalization leads to 0.06 units decrease in
profits. Similarly, 1 unit decrease in capitalization is associated with 0.06 units increase in profits.
Given that market share (MS) is insignificant in all regressions, it fails to support the ESH that profit is related to
greater market share related to firm-specific efficiencies rather than market concentration. On the other hand,
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efficiency (operating cost) influences performance regardless of market share, lending partial support to the ESH.
This formulation provides more evidence in favor of the ESH than the SCP hypothesis. The coefficient of HHI is
in contrast with the studies that supported the structure-performance relationship (Molyneux, 1992,
Lloyd-Williams et all, 1994) and is more compatible with recent work supporting neither version of ESH (see
Papadopoulos, 2004).
7. Policy Implication of Empirical Findings
Our results have certain implications for regulatory treatment of S&L associations in New York State. Since the
SCP hypothesis finds a positive relationship between concentration and profits, it cautions against mergers and
acquisitions and proposes policy interventions (anti-trust) to break up concentration. By contrast, ESH sees no
role for anti-trust or government intervention in bank mergers. Proponents of ESH assume that efficient banks
can “improve their market shares by providing more economical banking services in the market” (Seelanatha,
2010: 20). Therefore, in ESH paradigm, there is no need to employ anti-trust policy in order to improve market
efficiency. Our results do not support the policy implications of either theory. There is some evidence to support
the conclusion that New York S&L markets are sufficiently competitive. Neither market concentration nor
market shares explain profits. Therefore both SCP and ESH are rejected.
While on average HHI remains close to oligopolistic competition in descriptive statistics, it has no impact on
profit margin in regression analysis. Overall, New York markets appear to remain sufficiently diversified and
non-concentrated. Given that profitable institutions are efficient, it can be concluded that S&Ls enjoy
firm-specific advantages (cost saving); additional policies may be warranted in the future in order to maintain
competitive advantage and prevent any abuse of market power and extra profits of the largest banks. Such
approach should foster healthy market competition among firms allowing competitive and economical services
for their clients.
Our analysis further indicates that risk appears to be the most important component of bank performance.
Therefore, to maintain competitive advantage related to firm-specific efficiencies it is necessary to control risk
and mitigate the pro-cyclicality of bank profits in un-concentrated markets. One option is the application of more
robust internal and external risk rating processes. Policy interventions are warranted to increase the effectiveness
of risk management and measurement at the firm and industry levels. FDIC and OCC are taking action to
regulate risk more thoroughly, although it is too soon to tell the outcome. Overall, our results suggest policy
makers to focus on prudential regulations, adequate level of capitalization against losses and improvements in
risk management systems, which can enhance the performance of remaining S&Ls in the New York State.
8. Summary and Conclusions
The S&L industry has experienced poor performance as indicated by massive loan losses, mortgage defaults and
institutional failures throughout the 1980s and 1990s. This paper analyzed the determinants of profitability using
firm-specific and industry-specific data for the most recent period 2000-2010. It tested the market
structure-performance hypotheses (SCP and ESH) for all S&L associations in the New York State. Using data
from Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), we have utilized a total number of 420 observations across
40 financial institutions.
Overall, our results show that while credit risk undermines profitability (higher credit risk leads to lower return
on assets), capitalization tends to weaken profits. A higher ratio of loan loss provisions–to-total assets (CRIS1)
indicates the presence of S&Ls with riskier loans, and hence less profit. None of the market power hypotheses
(SCP, RMPH, ESH), however, support the importance of market structures as an explanation of profitability in
the S&L sector. Neither market share of individual firms nor market concentration has meaningful associations
with return on assets. On average, New York S&L markets appear to remain diversified and modestly
competitive in the period 2000-2010. In this regard, anti-trust policies are not a sine qua non since market
concentration is relatively insignificant. However, this does not invalidate the need for anti-trust, which prevails
to avert market power that may be associated with mergers and acquisitions.
Overall, evidence indicates that S&L profits are vulnerable to credit risks at the firm level. This suggests that it is
crucial to control the pro-cyclicality of firm profitability in a less concentrated market. Capitalization has an
inverse relationship with profitability. This implies that banks need to develop risk control systems that are
flexible enough to absorb loan related risks without hindering earnings. Risk management should go hand in
hand with adequate level of capitalization. Subsequently, a higher allowance for non-performing loans in normal
times and lower amount in bad times can mitigate the impact of credit risk on ROA. The topic of prudential
regulation includes how to subject banks to such provisions that might increase their operational costs. Also in
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ROA specification, an important negative effect on profitability was caused by operational costs--the managerial
efficiency variable. In other words, banks which pay more attention to cost control gain more profits.
Future research is necessary to test different measures of efficiency on profitability. A potentially useful
direction is to derive direct measures of X-efficiency and Scale-efficiency that more accurately account for the
relevant market. In order to derive them, some researchers used Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Also known
as non-parametric method, DEA is used for the estimation of productive efficiency of different units in industrial
organization studies. Likewise, future research can benefit from the correction of an endogeneity problem also
known as “omitted variables” bias. Inclusion of legal, political and other institutional variables can highlight the
impact of“regime change” on profit margins. GDP was excluded from the analysis given that all banks operate in
the same macroeconomic environment. Inclusion of other control variables, however, can better reveal the
performance of S&L sector in the New York State.
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Appendix
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Test Data
Symbol

Mean

Std. Dev.

Max.

Min.

Profitability

Variables

ROA

0.0045

0.0134

0.0396

-0.1060

Capitalization

EQV

0.1250

0.0679

0.8002

0.0566

Liquidity Risk

LIQ

0.6447

0.2088

0.9448

0.0163

Efficiency

EEFFR

0.8522

0.6615

56.607

-8.1364

MS

0.0259

0.0736

0.5776

0.0001

CRIS1

0.0083

0.0071

0.0656

0.0013

HHI

0.2344

0.0556

0.3467

0.1550

Market Share
Credit Risk
Concentration Ratio

Table 2. Correlation Among Independent Variables
Sample: 2000-2011
Included observations: 462
Balanced sample
Correlation

EQV

EQV

1.000000

LIQ

EEFFR

MS

CRIS1

NIMY

LIQ

-0.271738

1.000000

EEFFR

0.264956

-0.174112

1.000000

MS

-0.171680

0.010380

-0.045992

CRIS1

-0.064237

-0.140786

0.015326

0.068756

1.000000

NIMY

0.060425

0.343921

-0.212983

-0.269582

0.005611

1.000000

HHI

-0.040111

-0.041812

0.001500

0.011224

-0.128690

0.065455

HHI

1.000000

1.000000

Table 3. Panel Unit Root Test Results
Methods

LLC t*

Breitung t-stat

IPS W-stat

ADF-Fisher

2

PP-Fisher

2

Level
ln(ROA)

-7.14 (0.00)

2.75(0.99)

-0.83(0.20)

104.47(0.03)

159.553(0.00)

ln(EQV)

-11.05 (0.00)

1.35(0.91)

-0.07(0.46)

84.77(0.33)

60.07(0.80)

ln(LIQ)

-12.66(0.00)

0.55(0.71)

-3.00(0.00)

146.413(0.00)

72.62(0.70)

ln(EEFFR)

-318.60(0.00)

1.54(0.9)

-30.88(0.00)

135.88(0.00)

182.10(0.00)

ln(MS)

-18.47(0.00)

3.55(0.99)

-0.23(0.40)

69.42(0.79)

48.63(0.99)

ln(CRIS1)

-6.97(0.00)

2.67(0.99)

-0.11(0.45)

97.19(0.09)

130.25(0.00)

ln(NIMY)

-17.30(0.00)

-2.31(0.01)

-3.74(0.00)

137.01(0.00)

123.76(0.00)

ln(HHI)

-30.02(0.00)

-4.70(0.00)

-18.63(0.00)

406.56(0.00)

69.52(0.79)

First Diff.

 ln(ROA)
 ln(EQV)
 ln(EEFFR)
 ln(MS)
 ln(CRIS1)
 ln(HHI)

-12.92(0.00)

-0.92(0.17)

-4.34(0.00)

175.579(0.00)

300.696(0.00)

-15.54(0.00)

-3.31(0.00)

-3.24(0.00)

154.02(0.00)

187.58(0.00)

-1547.8(0.00)

-3.32(0.00)

-113.10(0.00)

181.09(0.00)

303.83(0.00)

-23.3(0.00)

-4.42(0.00)

-7.86(0.00)

230.83(0.00)

312.59(0.00)

-24.93(0.00)

-1.01(0.15)

-6.75(0.00)

198.31(0.00)

267.93(0.00)

-13.88(0.00)

-14.50(0.00)

-4.29(0.00)

125.45(0.00)

125.46(0.00)

Second Diff.
Note: All variables are expressed in natural logarithms. Individual intercept and time trend are included in test regressions. These tests
examines the null hypothesis of unit root (non-stationary) at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent critical values using the Schwarz criterion
for optimum lag differences. The figures in parenthesis are the p-values. The null hypothesis for the first two tests is the existence of a
common unit root (non-stationary) while for the other three tests the null is the presence of individual unit root.
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Table 4. Hausman Test Results
Chi-Sq. Statistic
Cross Section Random

12.4527 (0.0866)

Hausman indicates the Hausman (1978) specification test for correlated random effects. This test examines the null hypothesis of no
misspecification against the alternative of specification at 5 percent critical value. The figures in parenthesis are the p-values.

Table 5. Panel Estimated Generalized Least Square (PEGLS) Regression
Independent Variables

Profitability (ROA)

Capitalization (EQV)

-0.070***(-3.60)

-0.070***(-3.49)

Liquidity Risk (LIQ)

-0.021*(-1.95)

-0.021*(-1.88)

-0.020*(-1.70)

Efficiency (EEFFR)

-0.001***(-6.65)

-0.001***(-6.64)

-0.001***(-6.42)

Credit Risk (CRIS1)

-0.914***(-7.63)

-0.914***(-7.37)

-0.907***(-7.09)

0.009(0.14)

0.008(0.14)

0.004(0.064)

0.001(0.023)

0.005(0.075)

Net Interest Margin (NIMY)
Market Share (MS)
Concentration Ratio (HHI)

-0.06***(-3.29)

-0.017(-0.72)

Intercept

0.0002

0.0002

420

420

420

R-Squared

0.243

0.243

0.244

S.E. of regression

0.010

0.010

0.010

F. Statistic

26.61

22.12

19.02

Prob (F. Statistic)

0.000

0.000

0.000

Observations

0.0000

All variables are expressed in natural logarithms. ***Significant at 1 percent level or 0.01; ** Significant at 5 percent level or 0.05;
*Significant at 10 percent level or 0.1. The figures are in parenthesis are values of t-statistics. Three regressions are estimated to control the
effects of market share and concentration variables.

Figure 1. Consolidation in New York State S&L Industry
Source: Authors’ own calculation. FDIC Institution Directory
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Figure 2. Market Concentration
Source: Authors’ own calculation. FDIC Institution Directory

Figure 3. Largest S&Ls, Total Assets (September 31, 2011)
Source: Authors’ own calculation. FDIC Institution Directory
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